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Abstract 
Organic certification is based on controls on operators, and verify if they are compliant 
with  respect  to  organic  regulations.  Control  procedures  are  a  transaction  cost  that  
affect organic farming relative competiveness. Here we propose an analysis aiming at 
increasing  the  efficiency  in  the  individuation  of  key  risk  factors  in  the  organic 
certification process. The study refers to Italian organic farmers and represents an 
attempt to implement a risk based inspection scheme  based on a statistical approach.  
Introduction  
Certification is a distinctive feature of organic farming, and a concrete tool to assure 
that  organic  production  rules  are  fulfilled.  However,  organic  certification  costs 
represent an important competitive disadvantage for organic farming. An improvement 
in the efficiency of control procedures of organic control bodies may help in reducing 
this  transaction  cost,  providing  a  basis  for  a  general  increase  in  organic  farms 
competitiveness. Here we present the results of a study for risk based inspections 
aiming at facilitating the individuation of the main risk factors of non compliances for 
organic operators.  The study is part of the EU research project CERTCOST. The 
general aim is to individuate key factors that are more likely to be associated to non 
compliances,  using  both  parametric  and  non  parametric  approaches.  Only  non 
compliances that  generate sanctions are considered, and classified according to their 
severeness. A general description of the sanction distribution for 2008 is provided, and 
the main outcomes of the statistical analyses are discussed, also in terms of potential 
further research in this field. 
Materials and methods 
Data  are  taken  from  a  dataset  developed  in  the  CERTCOST  EU  Project,  and  are 
based on data from certification bodies from different Euroepan countries. Italian data 
are provided by ICEA, the main Italian certification body, and for 2008 consists of 
9.351 farmers, of which 1219 also have a processing activity. The dataset contains 
information  on  structural-managerial  characteristics  (e.g.  farm  size,  crops  types,  
livestock  types,  product  type),  control  data  (type  and  number  of  controls)  and 
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sanctions  data  (type  and  number  of  sanctions).  Explanatory  variables  have  been 
discretised  or  dicothomised.  Since  no  information  is  available  about  the  type  and 
severity of non-compliances, we use sanctions data as a proxy. Following Accredia 
guidelines,  for  each  operator  we  have  deduced  the  type  of  non-compliance 
encountered from the resulting sanctions. Sanctions have been grouped and recoded 
into  two  general  categories: moderat e sanct i ons,  ref erri ng t o i rregul ari t i es,  i . e.  l ess 
severe non-compliances, and severe sanctions, referring to infringements, i.e. most 
severe non-compliances. See Tab. 1 for a description of sanctions type distribution. 
On average, nearly 11% of the Italian farms were sanctioned in 2008. Almost 75 % of 
the sanction imposed was less severe (slight and moderate sanctions), while the rest 
(25%) were enclosed in the most severe group (severe and extreme).  
Tab.1: Distribution of sanctions by type, IT 2008. 
Number of operators   Nr. of sanctions  
imposed on a 
farm  Moderate sanctions  Severe sanctions  Total 
0  8.779  9.153  8.605 
1  430  147  545 
2  118  46  167 
3  13  4  14 
>4  11  1  20 
Total sanctions  751  255  1.006 
Source: CERTCOST database - ITALY 2008 
Here we present results arising from two approaches: a parametric approach based 
on binary choice models, and a probabilistic approach based on Bayesian Networks 
(BN).  The  binary  choice  model  here  used  is  a  logit  model,  based  on  logistic  
distribution, and allows to explain the presence of sanctions detected as function of a 
set  of  explanatory  variables  (Greene  2008).  The  logistic  distribution  has  been 
preferred to the standard normal distribution as it has shown a better management of 
the  extremely  sparse  data  on  sanctions  in  the  sample.  The  unrestricted  model 
consists of a wide explanatory variable set, with 46 variables referring to crop and 
livestock types (e.g. cereals, poultry, etc) , structural variables (e.g. utilisable arable 
area  (UAA),  livestock  units  activity,  etc)  and  specific  risk  factors  (occurrence  of 
sanctions in the previous year). A backward stepwise procedure has been followed, 
testing for statistical significance of the single coefficients (at least 5% significance 
required)  and  eliminating  those  that  proved  to  be  not  relevant.  Finally,  we  have 
performed a LR test to consider the validity of the restricted model. The BN approach 
(Horvitz et al., 1988) builds up a network of connections among variables, and the 
links  among  variables  are  measured  in  terms  of  conditional  probabilities.  More 
specifically BNs are used to determine the conditional probability of non-compliance 
given  a  set  of  “evidences”,  i.e.  the  actual  occurrence  of  the  event  that  a  certain 
variable assumes a given value. For instance, we can infer the probability of getting an 
infringement if a farmer cultivates a specific crop. The impact of evidences on the 
network  has  been  designed  using  the  PC  algorithm,  while  conditional  probabilities 
have been computed through the expecation maximiisation procedure of Hugin 7.0 
software. For both models, variables have been discretised or dichotomised.  
 
Results 
Results from logit regression and BN are summarised in Tab 2 and show the variables 
that  have  been  found  as  relevant  impact  on  the  risk  of  moderate  and  severe 
sanctions.  For  the  logit  model,  only  variables  resulting  from  the  restricted  model 
resulting from the stepwise estimation are listed (the final restricted model has passed 
the LR constraint test). For the BN model only variables showing a sensible impact on 
the probabilities of sanctions are considered. + and – signs are respectively meaning a 
positive or negative impact of the variable on the probability of a farmer to get at least 
one sanction. Labels in bold indicate variables that are relevant for both models.  
Tab. 2: Variables affecting sanctions risk: results from logit regression, ICEA 
data 2008. Variables are dichotomised, unless differently specified 
   Moderate Sanctions   Severe Sanctions 
   logit  bbn  logit  bbn 
Crop and livestock types         
Cereals      +     + 
Citrus      -     - 
Dried pulses      +     + 
Fresh vegetables         +    
Fruit   -          
Grapes   +     +    
Grassland   +     +    
Green fodder   +  +       
Industrial crops   -     +    
Olives            - 
Poultry   +     +    
Structural factors             
Conventional UAA  -     +  + 
GMO-risk crops (maize, soya)  -  +     + 
Livestock Units <10        +    
Crop structure complexity*  +  +  +  + 
Nr of products (nr)     +       
Processor  +     -    
UAA (ha)     +     + 
Sanctions         
Moderate Sanctions in 2007   +  +  +    
Severe sanctions in 2007         +  + 
*a Shannon index has been used for the logit models as a proxy of crop structure 
complexity, while the number of crops has been used for BN models; 
Discussion 
Results from Tab 2 indicate that among crop and livestock type category, logit and BN 
individuate different group of variables as relevant, with the only exception of “Green 
fodder”, which is considered as a risk factor for moderate sanctions in both models. 
Also, while many risk factors are common for both moderate and severe sanctions, 
some variables are only relevant for one sanction type: “Fresh vegetables”, “Fruit”, 
“Olives”. For what concerns the structural risk factors, “Conventional UAA” and “Crop 
structure complexity” are significant in both models, with the second one found as 
relevant  for  both  the  moderate  and  severe  sanction  risk.  Controversial  results  are 
found for “GMO-risk crops” in the moderate sanction models. Finally, almost univocal  
 
results are found for moderate and severe sanctions issued in 2007: it is interesting to 
note how the risk of  moderate sanctions is not affected by the occurrence of severe 
sanctions  in  2007,  while  some  evidence  from  the  logit  model  indicate  that  2007 
moderate  sanctions  increase  the  risk  of  severe  sanctions.  The  occurrence  of 
sanctions in 2007 can be interpreted as a proxy of the farmers’ individual effect, like 
farmers’ attitude to fraud, managerial errors, geographical aspects, etc. Unfortunately 
the scientific literature on these aspects is extremely scarce. Gambelli and Solfanelli 
(2009)  have  performed  similar  analysis  for  moderate  sanctions  using  a  dataset  of 
Italian farm from another certification body, testing different farm types risk of non-
compliances.  Similar results are found in particular for what concerns the key role of 
the sanctions issued in the previous years. Also, the negative effect on sanctions risk 
of citrus and olives and the positive one of livestock related crops (grassland, green 
fodder, mais) are confirmed in both studies. 
Conclusions 
The  approach  we  have  used  for  this  study  show  encouraging  results  and  can  be 
considered  as  complimentary  tools  for  understanding  risk  patterns  in  the  organic 
certification schemes. It is necessary to consider that results cannot be generalised 
and should be considered relevant only for the specific control body that provided the 
dataset.  Further  work  is  needed,  in  particular  for  what  concerns  the  analysis  of 
different combination of variables and the elaboration of more powerful econometric 
models. For what concerns the first aspect, it is reasonable to suppose that some 
variables  could  be  considered  at  risk  only  when  combined  with  other.  For  what 
concerns the second aspect, the incorporation of the time dimension and the use of 
count data models, which also explain the actual number of sanction detected, could 
be  considered  as  interesting  options  to  consider.  However,  the  general  approach 
focussing on a standardisation of sanction types and the use of probabilistic models 
can be considered a promising step towards the definition of a risk based inspection 
systems that could improve efficiency in the organic sector. 
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